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INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT-DOMICILE OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD-A Step Toward State and Tribal Cooperation in
Indian Child Custody Proceedings: Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v.
Natural Mother

I. INTRODUCTION
In Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,' the New Mexico

Court of Appeals held that an illegitimate child takes the domicile of the
natural mother at the time of the child's birth. 2 The mother said her
domicile was the Laguna Pueblo; therefore, the court found that the child's
domicile was the Pueblo. 3 The court concluded that under the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 4 the Pueblo tribal court had exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving an Indian child
domiciled on the Pueblo.5
This Note (1) presents the Pino court analysis of domicile of an illegitimate child as a basis for determining jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings, (2) discusses the ICWA's support of the Pino decision and (3) comments on the implications of Pino on future Indian
child welfare matters.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Afred Pino, the natural father, and co-Appellee, the natural mother, were residents, 6 domiciliaries, 7 and members of the Laguna
1. 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [cited as Pino].
2. Id. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
3. Id. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
4. Indian Child Welfare Act of November 8, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 101, 92 Stat. 3071
(1978), (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ICWA].
5. Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
6. Residence is defined in New Mexico as the place where a person actually lives or has his
home, a dwelling place, or place of habitation. Perez v. Health & Social Servs., 91 N.M. 334, 337,
573 P.2d 689, 692 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297 (1978). The natural
mother stated she was a resident of Laguna Pueblo. Petition for Waiver of Placement Restrictions,
Record Proper at 2, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198
(Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Placement]. She also gave a New Laguna, New Mexico,
address. Consent of Mother to Adoption, Record Proper at 15, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v.
Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Consent].
Alfred Pino stated that he is a lifelong resident of the Laguna Pueblo. Affidavit, Record Proper
at 116, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App.
1985) [hereinafter cited as Affidavit].
7. Domicile in New Mexico requires physical presence in the place at some time in the past plus
a concurrent intention to make the place one's home. Worland v. Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d
981 (1976). The natural mother was said to be domiciled on the Laguna Pueblo. In the Matter of
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Pueblo. 8 A relationship between Pino and Appellee developed while on
the Pueblo, 9 and Appellee became pregnant.'" Apparently due to inadequate facilities on the Pueblo," Appellee gave birth to a daughter in an
Albuquerque, New Mexico, hospital on May 11, 1983.2
Prior to the child's birth, Appellee made plans to place the child for
adoption. "3She expressed a preference for placing the child with a nonIndian family and for preserving her anonymity with regard to the birth,
placement .and adoption of the child.' 4 Appellee believed the child would
have a better life living off the reservation in a non-Indian home.' 5
On May 13, 1983, co-Appellees, the prospective adoptive parents, a
non-Indian couple, petitioned for 6 a Waiver of Placement Restrictions.' 7
the Petition of the Pueblo of Laguna, ex rel Edwin M. Martinez, For An Order that a Baby Child,
a minor, Be Declared a Ward of the Tribal Court and that Edwin M. Martinez Be Appointed Guardian
of Said Child, No. G83-00006 (Pueblo of Laguna Tribal Court at 4 (July 19, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Tribal Court]. Pino stated that he considered the Laguna Pueblo to be his permanent place
of domicile. Affidavit, Record Proper at 116.
8. The natural mother stated that she was a member of the Laguna tribe. Consent, Record Proper
at 15. Pino also stated that he was a member of the Pueblo of Laguna. Affidavit, Record Proper at
116.
9. Pino stated that the natural mother and he had shared a close mutual relationship. Affidavit,
Record Proper at 116. Pino also acknowledged a sexually intimate relationship with the natural
mother. Deposition of Alfred Pino at 56-57, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102
N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
10. The natural mother named Alfred Pino as the father of the child. Affidavit of Paternity, Record
Proper at 18, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct.
App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Paternity].
11.Appellant's Amended Brief in Chief at 3, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,
102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985). Other reasons for the natural mother's choice of
birthplace might be that she expressed a desire for anonymity with regard to the birth, placement,
and adoption of the child. Such anonymity might be jeopardized if the birthplace were the Laguna
Pueblo. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
12. The natural mother stated that the child was born on May 11,1983. Consent, Record Proper
at 15.
13. The natural mother stated the adoption had been privately arranged between the natural
mother's attorney and the prospective adoptive parents' attorney. Placement, Record Proper at 1.
See also Consent, Record Proper at 15 (natural mother stated that she wished to place the child for
adoption through her attorney).
Amicus expressed concerns about the Laguna Pueblo's allegations of possible impropriety in
securing the placement of the child. According to amicus, at the July 9, 1983, tribal court ex parte
hearing, the Pueblo's attorney alluded to the fact that a doctor removed the child from the hospital
five days after birth. The record indicated that the doctor had no legal authority to do so. The Order
Waiving Placement Restrictions allowed the child to be released to the mother's attorney, not to a
doctor. Amicus Curiae Brief, Record Proper at 61, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,
102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Amicus].
14. Consent, Record Proper at 15-16.
15. Memorandum of Law, Record Proper at 32-33, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural
Mother, 102 N.M 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
16. Placement, Record Proper at 1.
17. N.M. STAT. ANN., §40-7-19 (1978). The placement restrictions are:
no petition for adoption shall be granted by a district court unless the child sought
to be adopted was placed in the home of the proposed adopting parent or parents
by the department, by the appropriate public authority of another state or by a
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The New Mexico Children's Court granted the waiver 8 and gave the
prospective adoptive parents immediate custody of the child for purposes
of adoption.' 9 On May 23, 1983, the natural mother filed an Adoption
Consent in the children's court voluntarily terminating her parental rights2"
and signed an Affidavit of Paternity2 ' naming Appellant Pino as the natural
father.22 On May 26, 1983, the prospective adoptive parents entered a
Petition for Adoption in the children's court.23
On June 8, 1983, the Pueblo sought to intervene 24 in the action and to
have the adoption proceedings dismissed. 25 In support of its motions, the
Pueblo argued that the ICWA gave it exclusive jurisdiction over the
adoption of an Indian child who is eligible for membership in the Laguna
Pueblo Tribe.26 The children's court recognized the Pueblo's interest in

the adoption proceedings and granted the Motion to Intervene .27 The
children's court, however, denied the Pueblo's Motion to Dismiss 28 bechild placement agency that is licensed by either the department or the appropriate
licensing authority of such other state where the agency is located, and such is
verified by filing of an affidavit along with the petition setting out the facts of
the placement of the child. . . . Provided, however, the court may in an independent action, waive the restrictions in this section prior to the actual placement
of the proposed adoptive child ...
18. Order Waiving Placement Restrictions, Record Proper at 8, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v.
Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Order Waiving].
19. Id. at 9.
20. Consent, Record Proper at 16.
21. Paternity, Record Proper at 18.
22. Id. Alfred acknowledged paternity on August 26, 1983. Affidavit, Record Proper at 116.
23. Petition for Adoption, Record Proper at 11, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,
102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
24. Motion to Intervene, Record Proper at 20, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,
102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Pueblo Intervene].
25. Motion to Dismiss, Record Proper at 22, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother,
102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Pueblo Dismiss].
26. Pueblo Intervene, Record Proper at 20. The Laguna Tribal Court moved to intervene pursuant
to the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c), which provides as follows: In any state court proceedings for
the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian
of the child and the Indian child's Tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.
Id.
The tribal court moved to dismiss the adoption proceedings pursuant to the ICWA, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911 (a), which provides as follows: "An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any
State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within
the reservation of such tribe." Pueblo Dismiss, Record Proper at 22.
On its own motion on July 22, 1983, the children's court ordered Nancy Tuthill, the Deputy
Director of the American Indian Law Center, University of New Mexico Law School, to submit an
amicus curiae brief on the questions presented in the Pueblo's Motions to Intervene and Dismiss.
Order, Record Proper at 26, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700
P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
27. Letter from John E. Brown, District Judge, Children's Court Division to Attorneys for the
natural mother, Laguna Pueblo and prospective adoptive parents (August 19, 1983), Record Proper
at 109, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App.
1985) [hereinafter cited as Letter].
28. Id. at 108.
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cause it found that it had concurrent jurisdiction over an Indian child not
domiciled on the reservation. 29
In determining that the child was not Pueblo-domiciled, the children's
court adopted the natural mother's and prospective adoptive parents'
arguments that once the natural mother voluntarily terminated her parental
rights to the child, the child was left parentless.30 The court reasoned that
the mother's relinquishment gave the child the status of an orphan 3 and
that the orphaned child assumed the domicile of the party standing in
loco parentis.32 Since the prospective adoptive parents placed themselves
in the role of parents through their petition for a Waiver of Placement
Restrictions, temporary custody, and the Petition for Adoption, they were
the party standing in loco parentis.33 Because the prospective adoptive
parents gave their domicile as Albuquerque, the court determined that
the child's domicile was also Albuquerque. 34 Thus, the children's court
found it had jurisdiction over the child.35
On July 19, 1983, under authority of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
the Pueblo of Laguna Tribal Court conducted an ex parte hearing36 and
29. Id.
30. Id. The children's court stated that "the court accepts the arguments of Petitioner that the
child is not domiciled or residing on the reservation" but it did not elaborate on the reasons why.
Id. Since there was no indication otherwise, this Note assumes the arguments of the children's court
and the natural mother/prospective adoptive parents are identical. For the natural mother/prospective
adoptive parents' arguments, see Memorandum, Record Proper at 32-34; see also supra and infra
notes 30-35, 94 and accompanying text. For the Pueblo's arguments, see Memorandum Brief in
Support of Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Intervene, In the Matter of the Adoption of a Baby
Child, No. CH-83-00810 (August 10, 1983). For Pino's arguments see infra notes 43 and 44 and
accompanying text.
31. Memorandum, Record Proper at 33.
32. Id. at 33-34.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 34.
35. Id. The children's court relied on the concurrent jurisdictional provisions of the ICWA, 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b) which provides:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation
of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by
either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the
Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination
by the tribal court of such tribe.
36. The ex parte hearing was held after the Pueblo moved to intervene and to dismiss (June 18,
1983) and before the children's court's denial of the Pueblo's motion to dismiss and grant of the
Pueblo's motion to intervene (August 19, 1983).
Pursuant to the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) and upon filing a Petition for Wardship and Guardianship by the Pueblo of Laguna's Governor, Edwin M. Martinez, on June 10, 1983, a hearing date
was scheduled in the Laguna Tribal Court. The Attorneys for the natural mother and prospective
adoptive parents were notified of the scheduled hearing date by telephone. Neither of the Attorneys
were present at the hearing on the Petition for Wardship and Guardianship on June 27, 1983. An
ex parte proceeding was held, the court finding that sufficient notice of the proceeding was given
to the Attorneys. Tribal Court at 2.
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declared the minor child a ward of the tribal court.37 The Pueblo Court
appointed the Laguna Pueblo Governor as the minor child's guardian. 38
Only counsel for Alfred Pino and the Laguna Pueblo were present at the
hearing. "
Aside from the parties addressing the issue in memoranda of law to
the court, 4° it is unclear from the record how the children's court became
aware of the tribal court's ex parte hearing. Nevertheless, on August 19,
the children's court refused to give full faith and credit to the Laguna
Tribal Court's Order declaring the child a ward of the Pueblo and appointing the Governor of the Pueblo as the child's guardian. 4 The court
reasoned that the tribal court proceeding could not be accorded full faith
and credit because the proceeding denied the natural mother and prospective adoptive parents due process of law.42
On August 26, 1983, Appellant Pino moved to intervene"3 and to
dismiss" the children's court proceedings. In an accompanying affidavit,
Pino acknowleged his paternity and expressed a willingness to care for
and raise his daughter in the traditional Laguna way, as a proud and
upstanding member of the Indian community."5
In its March 1, 1984 Order,' the children's court recognized Appellant
Pino's paternity"7 and granted his Motion to Intervene. The children's
37. Declaration of Wardship and Order of Appointment of Guardian, In the Matter of the Petition
of the Pueblo of Laguna, ex rel. Edwin M. Martinez, For An Order that a Baby Child, a minor, Be
Declared a Ward of the Tribal Court and that Edwin M. Martinez be Appointed Guardian of Said
Child, No. G-83-0006, (Pueblo of Laguna Tribal Court, July 19, 1983).
38. Id.
39. See supra note 36.
40. See Memorandum, Record Proper at 37-39; Amicus, Record Proper at 64-68.
41. Letter, Record Proper at 109.
42. Id. Evidently, the children's court accepted the natural mother/prospective adoptive parents'
argument that the oral notice given to the attorneys was insufficient notice to the parties themselves
who had no counsel of record for the tribal court proceedings and who had given no authority to
any counsel to accept service for them. Memorandum, Record Proper at 39-40. See infra note 36.
43. Pino moved the children's court to intervene pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) which provides:
[iln any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the
parent or Indian custodian and the child's tribe . . . of the pending proceedings
and of their right of intervention ...
Motion to Intervene and Motion to Dismiss, Record Proper at 112, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino
v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Pino's Motions].
44. Pino moved the court to dismiss pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 191 i(a). Pino's Motions, Record
Proper at 112. See supra note 26 regarding § 1911 (a).
45. Affidavit, Record Proper at 116-17.
46. Order, Record Proper at 190, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M.
735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Order].
47. Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record Proper at 188-89, Adoption of
Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Court's Findings]. The court stated that Alfred Pino was not a putative father but an unwed
father whose consent to adoption had to be obtained or whose paternal rights had to be terminated
prior to the adoption of the child. Id. at 189.
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court, however, denied Pino's motion to dismiss48 on the grounds that
the Indian child was not a domiciliary of the Laguna Pueblo49 and thus,
was under the concurrent jurisdiction of the children's court. 5" Pino then
petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court for a Writ of Prohibition or
Superintending Control to challenge the children's court's jurisdiction. 5
On May 16, 1984, the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the petition
without explanation in a per curiam order.5"
Following the New Mexico Supreme Court's denial of the Writ, the
children's court, on July 31, 1984, held a hearing on the prospective
adoptive parents' Motion to Waive Appellant Pino's Consent to Adoption. 53 The court granted the motion, noting that Pino failed to enter his
appearance in the adoption proceeding54 and failed to attend the hearing
on the motion to waive his consent. 5 On the same date, the children's
court entered a Final Decree of Adoption,56 holding that good cause
existed to grant the prospective adoptive parents a final adoption decree57
and to waive the Indian child placement preferences designated in the
ICWA. 58
48. Id.
49. Court's Findings, Record Proper at 187. Additionally, in view of the intent of the natural
mother to withdraw her consent to the adoption if the natural father persisted in pursuing custody
of the child, the children's court determined that any orders of the court contrary to the natural
mother's wishes could lead to useless court proceedings. Id. at 189. The children's court, therefore,
denied the natural father's motion to dismiss. Id.
50. Id. at 188.
51. Petition for Writ of Prohibition or Writ of Superintending Control, May 10, 1984, Alfred
Pino v. Hon. John E. Brown, No. 15,417 (May 16, 1984).
52. Alfred Pino v. Hon. John E. Brown, No. 15,417 (May 16, 1984).
53. The Motion to Waive Consent was filed on May 9, 1984. Motion to Waive Consent, Record
Proper at 192, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct.
App. 1985).
54. Order, Record Proper at 199, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M.
735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Order Waiving Consent].
55. Id. The children's court stated that there was no need to acquire the consent of the putative
father in the adoption proceeding. This statement contradicts the previous finding by the children's
court that Pino was an unwed, not a putative, father whose consent was required. See supra note
46.
56. Final Decree of Adoption, Record Proper at 201, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural
Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
57. Id. Although the children's court did not specify the "good cause" grounds, it can be inferred
from the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that they were: 1) the natural mother
voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the infant; 2) the natural mother expressed a strong
desire for placement for adoption in a non-Indian family residing off the Laguna Pueblo; 3) the child
was not residenced or domiciled on the Laguna Pueblo; and 4) the natural mother expressed a
willingness to withdraw the adoption consent if the natural father persisted in claiming his parental
rights under the ICWA. Court's Findings, Record Proper at 187-88.
58. Id. The children's court did not specify what the "good cause" grounds were not to follow
the ICWA placement preferences. But the "good cause" grounds set out supra note 57 are most
likely on point.
The ICWA placement preferences are governed by 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which provides: "[in
any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in absence
of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with 1) a member of the child's extended family; 2)
other members of the Indian child's tribe; or 3) other Indian families."
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Appellants Pino5 9 and Laguna Pueblo 6° subsequently filed motions with
the children's court for relief from the Order Waiving Consent and the
Final Decree of Adoption. Alternatively, they moved for an extension of
time within which to file a Notice of Appeal. 6 The children's court denied
all motions,62 and Appellants appealed to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals.63

After recognizing that the Indian Child Welfare Act predicates tribal
jurisdiction on a child's domicile, 6 the court of appeals found that an
illegitimate child takes the domicile of its natural mother at the time of
its birth.65 The natural mother stated that the Pueblo was her domicile.'
Since the minor child assumed the mother's Pueblo-domicile,6 7 the court
of appeals found that, as provided in the ICWA,6" the tribal court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding. 69 Finding that the children's
59. Motion to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal and Motion for Relief from an Order,
Record Proper at 203, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d
198 (Ct. App. 1985). The motion was filed on August 30, 1984. In an accompanying affidavit, the
attorney for Alfred Pino stated that he was notified by the children's court on May 9, 1984, of a
May 25, 1984, hearing upon the natural mother's/prospective adoptive parents' Motion to Waive
Consent of Alfred Pino, the natural father. Affidavit, Record Proper at 205, Adoption of Baby Child,
Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985). Pino's attorney said he was
informed on May 24, 1984, by letter from the natural mother/prospective adoptive parents' attorneys
that they had vacated the May 25, 1984, hearing and that the hearing was reset for July 31, 1984.
Id. He said that he did not receive notice of the July 31, 1984, hearing from the children's court,
id., that he had reason to believe there was a possibility of settling the case, and that this was why
he did not appear at the hearing. Id. at 206. He stated that he was informed of the Order and Final
Decree of Adoption by way of a courtesy copy sent by the petitioner's attorney on August 10, 1984.
Id.
Pino's Motion for Relief was made pursuant to N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which provides in pertinent
part that "the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the
following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void ..
"
60. Motion of Intervenor, Pueblo of Laguna for Relief from an Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b) and
Alternatively to Extend the Time for Filing Notice of Appeal, Record Proper at 220, Adoption of
Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985). The motion
was filed on September 7, 1984. The Pueblo incorporated by reference the reasons for its motions
as those stated in Alfred Pino's similar motion. Id. at 220. See supra note 59.
61. See supra notes 59 and 60, and accompanying text. See also N.M. R. App. 202(c).
62. Order, Record Proper at 231. Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M.
735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985). The order was filed on November 5, 1984. The children's court
stated that it accepted the natural mother's/prospective adoptive parents' arguments that a Motion
to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal, filed after the time limitations specified by the rules,
could not be granted. Id. Evidently, the time for filing a motion to extend time for filing an appeal
ran on August 10, 1984. Response to Motion to Extend Time and Motion for Relief, Record Proper
at 223, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App.
1985).
63. Joint Notice of Appeal, Record Proper at 233, Adoption of Baby Child, Pino v. Natural
Mother, 102 N.M. 735, 700 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1985).
64. Pino, 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
65. Id. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
66. Id. at 738,700 P.2d at 201.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
69. Id. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
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court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals reversed the
order of the children's court denying relief and remanded with directions
for the children's court to vacate its judgment. 7 °
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

71

A. Pino's Analysis of Jurisdiction and Domicile of an Illegitimate
Child
The issue presented in Pino was whether the tribal or state court had
jurisdiction over the Indian child custody proceedings. 72 To resolve the
issue, the Pino court determined that the ICWA's provision granting
the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction controlled.73 Section 1911 (a)
provides:
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusively as to any State
over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except
where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the state by existing
federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the
70. Id. This case is currently pending in the Laguna Tribal Court. The natural mother now wants
custody of the child. Following a psychiatric evaluation of the natural mother, Alfred Pino, and the
child, a hearing will be held to determine whether the natural mother or Alfred Pino will have
custody of the child. Although the tribal court determined that the prospective adoptive parents were
no longer eligible for custody, they have temporary custody of the child pending the outcome of the
hearing. Telephone conversation with Anthony Little, Alfred Pino's Attorney (December 2, 1985).
71. The Court of Appeals found that it was not precluded from finding a lack of jurisdiction in
the Children's Court after the Supreme Court had denied a Writ of Prohibition when lack of jurisdiction
was argued in support of the Writ. State v. Sisneros, 98 N.M. 201,647 P.2d 403 (1982), distinguished,
Pino, 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200. When a trial court is totally lacking in jurisdiction, a Writ
of Prohibition is issued "almost" as a matter of right. State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710, 712, 460 P.2d
240, 242 (1969); Pino 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200. However, when there exists an adequate
remedy at law, the Writ can be denied. State v. Reese, 91 N.M. 76, 570 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1977);
Pino, 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
Interpreting the Supreme Court's denial of the Writ without explanation to mean Appellants had
an adequate remedy at law, i.e., an appeal to the court of appeals of the jurisdictional issue, the
court of appeals found the Supreme Court had not reached the merits of the issue argued in support
of the Writ. Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals reviewed whether the children's court had jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings. Id.
The court of appeals also dismissed Appellee's argument that the jurisdictional issue was not
properly before the court on an appeal of denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. Id. Subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised any time in the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. Chavez v.
County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974); Pino, 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
Rule 60(b)(4) is a proper means of attacking the subject matter jurisdiction of the children's court.
Id. Since the children's court lacked jurisdiction, the judgment denying Rule 60(b)(4) relief was
void. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
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Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the
residence or domicile of the child.74

The Laguna Pueblo was clearly an "Indian tribe" within the meaning
of Section 1911(a).75 Likewise, the adoption proceeding in Pino was a
"child custody proceeding" ;76 the child was indisputably an "Indian child" ;77
and the Laguna Pueblo constituted a "reservation" within the meaning
of the ICWA. 8 Thus, the only question in determining jurisdiction was
whether the minor child was domiciled within the Pueblo.79
The term "domicile" is not defined in the ICWA. 8 ° Rather than turning
to the policy of the ICWA or ICWA case law to determine the definition
of domicile, the court of appeals relied on its former opinion in Gomez
74. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (a).
New Mexico has not assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Act
of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)); Chino
v.Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977).
The children's court relied on the concurrent jurisdictional provision of the ICWA, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911 (b). See supra note 35.
75. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) provides: "'Indian tribe'
means any Indian tribe,
band, nation,
or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided
to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians .. "
The Laguna Pueblo is duly recognized by the Interior Department, 48 Fed. Reg. 56862, 56864
(1983).
76. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) provides:
child custody proceeding shall mean and include-(i) "foster care placement"
(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action resulting
in the termination of the parent-child relationship . ..(iii) "preadoptive placement" which shall mean the temporary placement of an Indian child in a foster
home or institution after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu
of adoptive palcement and (iv) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting
in a final decree of adoption.
Pino, 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
77. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) provides: "'Indian child' means any unmarried person who...
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe."
78. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(10) provides:
reservation means Indian country as defined in Section 1511 of title 18 and any
lands, not covered under such section, title to which is either held by the United
States in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any
Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United States against
alienation.
Generally, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) held that Pueblo Indian lands in New
Mexico are Indian country (i.e., reservations).
79. Pino, 102 N.M. at 737, 700 P.2d at 200.
80. Id. The legislative history of the ICWA states that "the provisions on exclusive tribal jurisdiction confirms the developing federal and state case law holding that the tribe has exclusive
jurisdiction when the child is residing or domiciled on the reservation." Wisconsin Potowatomies
v. Houston, 293 F. Supp. 719 (1973); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333 (1975); In re Matter
of Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975); Duckhead v. Anderson et al., Wash. Sup. Ct., November 4,
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v. Snyder Ranch.8' In Gomez the court of appeals held that at birth an
infant acquires the same domicile as the parent with whom the child
lives.82 Pino held that an illegitimate child takes the domicile of its natural
mother at the time of its birth. 83 The Pino court extended the Gomez rule
to include children who do not live with their parents after birth.84 Furthermore, the child acquires the natural mother's domicile even if that
mother has consented to adoption.85
Although the court of appeals made no reference to the Gomez court's
discussion8 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts,87 its reliance on
Gomez suggests that it may have considered the Restatement in expanding
the Gomez holding. The Restatement provides that an illegitimate child
takes the natural mother's domicile at the time of birth. 8 8 The Pino holding
echoes the Restatement language.89 The court of appeals relied on the
mother's statement that her residence was located on the Laguna Pueblo 9'
and on the fact that the record contained no evidence to indicate that the
mother was neither a resident nor a domiciliary of the Pueblo. 9' The Pino
court, therefore, concluded that the baby child took the mother's Pueblo
domicile.92
In so holding, the court of appeals implicitly rejected the children's
court reasoning that the child was not domiciled on the Pueblo.93 More
specifically, the court of appeals rejected the reasoning that, when the
1976. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 7530, 7544-7545 [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.].
The Department of Interior published regulations to establish procedures for implementation of
the ICWA. The regulations include the following: "comments were received asking for definition
of 'domicile' and 'residence.' Ultimate definition of the terminology in question must be in accordance
with caselaw." Department of Interior's Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 45100 (1979).
The ICWA requires that the child's residence or domicile be on the reservation, not both. See
ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(a). If the children's court had ruled that the child was either residenced
or domiciled on the Laguna Pueblo, the children's court was without subject matter jurisdiction.
There was no indication from the record why the jurisdictional focus was on domicile rather than
on residence. Because the test for residence is fairly straightforward, the focus could have been on
residence. See supra note 6.
81. 101 N.M. 44, 678 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1983).
82. Gomez- 101 N.M. at 44, 678 P.2d at 219.
83. Pino, 102 N.M. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
84. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
85. Id.
86. Id.; Gomez, 101 N.M. at 45, 678 P.2d at 220.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcTs OF LAW, § 22, comment c, 89 (197 1) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT]. Comment c states "an illegitimate child has the domicile of his mother ....
and "[a]t birth . . . takes the domicile his mother has at the time as his domicile of origin. ...
[Tlhe child's domicile will remain unchanged until such time as he acquires another domicile ....
88. Id. Emphasis added in text.
89. Pino, 102 N.M. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
90. Id. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201; see supra note 6.
91. Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201; see supra notes 6 and 7.
92. Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
93. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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natural mother consented to adoption and voluntarily terminated parental
rights, the child's status changed to that of an orphan and that the child
took the domicile of those standing in loco parentis.9 4 Because the baby
94. Id. The natural mother's consent to adoption was one of the methods by which the children's
court claimed that the Indian child's domicile shifted to that of the prospective adoptive parents.
Memorandum, Record Proper at 32-34. The children's court found that a parent who has voluntarily
terminated parental rights to an infant has left the infant parentless. Id. at 32. The natural mother
of the baby child, the children's court continued, terminated her rights before the court on May 23,
1983. Id. The court concluded that since the relinquishment of parental rights had not been revoked,
id. at 33, the child became an orphan until the proceeding for adoption was finalized, id., and
thereby acquired the Albuquerque domicile of the party standing in loco parentis, i.e., the prospective
adoptive parents. Id. at 34.
New Mexico has not addressed the issue of whether the act of consenting to adoption changes a
child's domicile. However, there is other state ICWA case law on point. For example, the Arizona
Court of Appeals in Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App.
1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), ruled that the domicile of an infant born out of wedlock
remains that of its mother until a new one is lawfully acquired. The Pima court suggested that
placing the child for adoption did not constitute abandonment and therefore had no effect on the
child's domicile. See id. at 206, 635 P.2d at 191. Under facts very similar to Pino, the Arizona
court stated that "[a]lthough the child was living in Arizona with the prospective adoptive parents
pursuant to a temporary custody order, its domicile had not been legally changed and therefore, it
was a domiciliary of the reservation in Montana. The only change in the status of appellant's child
was his removal to this state by reason of appellant's relinquishment of him for the purpose of
adoption." Id.
The Arizona court in Pima refused to accept that the child's domicile had changed even though
the mother had terminated her parental rights when she consented to adoption. See id. The Pino
court implicitly accepted the Pima rationale that the child's domicile was not affected by the consent
to adoption by finding that the child had acquired the mother's Pueblo domicile. See Pino, 102
N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
The Pinodecision found additional support in the South Dakota Supreme Court and the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts. In In re D.L.L. and C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 282 (S.D. 1980), the South
Dakota Supreme Court held that the domicile of a minor child was the domicile of the parents until
legally changed and the reservation domicile was not lost by any supposed abandonment on the part
of the parents or by a temporary arrangement in foster care.
Furthermore, the relevant Restatement (Second) of Conflicts comment states, "[t]he child's domicil
will remain unchanged until such time as he acquires another domicil in one of the ways stated
below. RESTATEMENT at 89. Adoption is one of the methods by which the Restatement says domicile
can be shifted. Id. at 91. Comment g states that "[the child, at the moment of adoption, takes the
... (emphasis added). Id. Although New Mexico has not addressed
domicil of the adoptive parents.
the issue of when the moment of adoption occurs, the comment interpreted literally suggests that
since the adoption had not occurred, the sole act of the natural mother consenting to adoption had
no effect on the Indian child's Pueblo domicile.
These cases, the Restatement, and Pino demonstrate that the children's court erred in embracing
the consent to adoption theory. These authorities require that the child's domicile be legally changed
and suggest that relinquishing parental rights by consenting to adoption is not a method by which
a child's domicile is legally changed, nor does it render a child an orphan. Therefore when a mother
consents to adopting her illegitimate child, the child retains its mother's domicile until the moment
of adoption occurs. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
The mistaken finding that the child became orphaned upon the natural mother's consent to adoption
was further exacerbated by the children's court finding that the orphaned child assumed the domicile
of the party standing in loco parentis. Memorandum, Record Proper at 34. Misapplication of the in
loco parentis theory led the children's court to conclude that it had concurrent jurisdiction over an
Indian child not Pueblo-domiciled. Id. at 32-34.
The children's court used the in Ioco parentis theory to find the natural mother relinquished all
parental rights, including the right to control the domicile of her child when she consented to the
child's adoption. Id. Under this theory, the children's court ruled that the child's domicile shifted
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child was domiciled on the Pueblo, the Pino court found exclusive jurisdiction in the tribal court as provided in the ICWA and ordered the
children's court to vacate its judgment.9"
B. The ICWA Underpins the Pino Decision96

Although the court of appeals did not rely on the policy of the ICWA
to reject the children's court's decision, their decision is consistent with
unilaterally to those standing in loco parentis to the child, the prospective adoptive parents. Id. If
the child had become an orphan after the consent to adoption, then the children's court could have
been correct in finding that the child assumed the Albuquerque domicile. See Montoya v. Collier,
85 N.M. 356, 359, 512 P.2d 684, 687 (1973); Fevig v. Fevig, 90 N.M. 51, 559 P.2d 839 (1977).
However, the in loco parentis or "natural guardianship" theory applies ifboth parents of a child
are dead or if the child is abandoned by both parents or by a surviving parent and no guardian of
the child's person is appointed. RESTATEMENT at 92. If the child is orphaned or abandoned, then the
"child should acquire a domicile at the home of a grandparent or other person who stands in loco
parentis to him and with whom he lives. To date, the cases have placed the child's domicile, in
circumstances dealt with here, at the home of a grandparent or other close relative." Id.
Even if the child were an orphan or abandoned, the children's court's interpretation of domicile
within the in loco parentis theory would have created unprecedented case law. All the cases adopted
by the children's court in support of the in loco parentis theory involved blood relatives. Montoya,
85 N.M. at 359, 512 P.2d at 687 (aunt); Fevig at 53, 559 P.2d at 841 (sister). Similarly, other
jurisdictions have granted in loco parentis status to blood relatives only and not to non-related
individuals. See In re Huck, 435 Pa. 325, 257 A.2d 522 (1969) (one parent dead and the other
incompetent; domicile of children found to be with grandparent with whom they lived.) For cases
supporting the view that under the circumstances dealt with in this Note a child acquires a domicile
at the home of a close relative, other than a grandparent, with whom he lives, see Lehmer v. Hardy,
294 F. 407 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (aunt); Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 250 F. 554 (2d Cir.
1918) (brother); Loftin v. Carden, 203 Ala. 405, 83 So. 174 (1919) (aunt); Hughes v. Industrial
Comm., 69 Ariz. 193, 211 P.2d 463 (1949) (aunt); In re Lancey's Guardianship, 232 Iowa 191, 2
N.W.2d 787 (1942) (uncle); Jensen v. Sorenson, 211 Iowa 354, 233 N.W. 717 (1930) (aunt); State
ex rel. Brown v. Hamilton, 202 Mo.377, 100 S.W. 609 (1907) (aunt).
A review of the cases does not reveal an distinguishable reason for granting in loco parentis
status to blood relatives only. However, one reason might be to protect familial ties and to give
custodial priority to family members when a child has been orphaned or abandoned.
In summary, the Pino court implicitly rejected the children's court finding that the child became
an orphan when the natural mother relinquished parental rights. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 737-38, 700
P.2d at 200-01. Upon rejecting the premise that the child was an orphan, the children's court finding
that the child's domicile shifted unilaterally to those standing in loco parentis to the child was also
rejected. Id.
95. Pino, 102 N.M. at738, 700 P.2d at201.
96. Prior to the enactment of the ICWA, the United States Supreme Court consistently held that
an Indian tribe, as an inherent attribute of its sovereignty, generally maintains exclusive jurisdiction
over matters involving important internal tribal affairs. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450,
U.S. 544 (1981) (held that the Crow Tribe lacked inherent civil authority to regulate fishing by nonIndians on non-Indian lands within reservation boundaries when no important tribal interests were
directly affected. The case involved sport fishing and duck hunting on the Big Hom River. Id. at
1245, n. 1.The Court held that the State of Montana owned the bed of the river and that the tribe
had not shown an important tribal interest in regulating non-Indian hunting and fishing on the river
or adjacent non-Indian lands because the Crow Tribe had not historically depended on fishing and
because the tribe had not alleged that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperiled the
subsistence or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 1253, 1258-59); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49 (1978) (Indians sued in a federal district court claiming that the actions of an Indian tribal
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that policy. The children's court's reliance on the consent to adoption
and in loco parentis theories to find that the child was not domiciled on
the Pueblo undermined the policies of the ICWA. 97 It deprived the tribal
court of exclusive jurisdiction over an Indian child born of parents domiciled on the reservation solely because the Indian mother consented to
adoption in state courts.98 Given the purpose of the ICWA to have tribes
decide the custody of their children," the children's court action infringed
on the tribe's authority pursuant to the ICWA' °° and was properly overruled by the New Mexico Court of Appeals.' 0
government denying them membership deprived them of equal protection of tribal laws and due
process of law contrary to the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court held that the federal
courts had no jurisdiction to review such tribal actions. The Court stated: "Tribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians."); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (a Navajo Indian had pleaded guilty in the Navajo Tribal Court to
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The United States later sought to try the defendant for
rape arising out of the same incident, but was met by a plea of double jeopardy. Unless the
governmental powers of the Navajo Tribe, like those of a state, were exercised as those of a sovereign
separate from the federal government, double jeopardy would bar the second trial. The Court reviewed
its decisions over the years and held that the second prosecution was not barred, because the tribe
was a distinct sovereignty:
[T]he power to punish offenses against tribal law committed by Tribe members,
which was part of the Navajos' primeval sovereignty, has never been taken away
from them, either explicitly or implicitly, and is attributable in no way to any
delegation to them of federal authority. It follows that when the Navajo Tribe
exercises this power, it does so as part of its retained sovereignty and not as an
arm of the Federal Government. Unless this power is removed by explicit legislation or is given up by the tribe, either expressly or as a part of its coming
under the protection of the United States, exclusive tribal judicial jurisdiction
over reservation affairs is retained);
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (held that the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court had
exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding where all parties were tribal members and reservation residents); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (held that adultery involving only
Indians was excluded from Indian Country Crimes Act jurisdiction, but lower courts have sustained
federal jurisdiction in interracial cases. Quiver concerned matters deemed to be within internal tribal
affairs). See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982). Accordingly, under principles
of Federal Indian law, the custody and adoption of the minor child is an important internal tribal
affair for the Pueblo to decide. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-89 (1976). In any event
that conclusion was supported by the ICWA.
97. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 provides:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the
best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by the establishmet of minimum Federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children
in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture,
and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and
family service programs.
98. Memorandum, Record Proper at 32-34.
99. See supra note 97.
100. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
101. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
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The ICWA was a response to an Indian child welfare crisis of massive
proportions." 2 Congress expressly found that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families were broken up by the often unwarranted
' Ignorance of Indian cultural values and social
removal of their children. 03
norms caused non-tribal public and private agencies to place disproportionately large numbers of Indian children in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions. 104 States failed to recognize the essential tribal
relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing
102. The House Report submitted during the congressional debates discussed the statistics indicating the magnitude of the crisis:
The wholesale separation of Indian children from their families is perhaps
the most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today.
Surveys of States with large Indian populations conducted by the Association
of American Indian Affairs (AAIA) in 1969 and again in 1974 indicate that
approximately 25-35 percent of all Indian children are separated from their
families and placed in foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions. In some
States the problem is getting worse: in Minnesota, one in every eight Indian
children under 18 years of age is living in an adoptive home; and, in 1971-72,
nearly one in every four Indian children under I year of age was adopted.
The disparity in placement rates for Indians and non-Indians is shocking. In
Minnesota, Indian children are placed in foster care or in adoptive homes at a
per capita rate five times greater than non-Indian children. In Montana, the
ratio of Indian foster-care placement is at least 13 times greater. In South
Dakota, 40 percent of all adoptions made by the State's Department of Public
Welfare since 1967-68 are of Indian children, yet Indians make up only 7
percent of the juvenile population. The number of South Dakota Indian children
living in foster homes is per capita, nearly 16 times greater than the non-Indian
rate. In the State of Washington, the Indian adoption rate is 19 times greater
and the foster care rate 10 times greater. In Wisconsin, the risk run by Indian
children of being separated from their parents is nearly 1,600 percent greater
than it is for non-Indian children. Just as Indian children are exposed to these
great hazards, their parents are too.
The Federal boarding school and dormitory programs also contribute to the
destruction of Indian family and community life. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), in its school census for 1971, indicates that 34,538 children live in its
institutional facilities rather than at home. This represents more than 17 percent
of the Indian school age population of federally-recognized reservations and
60 percent of the children enrolled in BIA schools. On the Navajo Reservation,
about 20,000 children or 90 percent of the BIA school population in grades K12, live at boarding schools. A number of Indian children are also institutionalized in mission schools, training schools, etc.
In addition to the trauma of separation from their families, most Indian
children in placement or in institutions have to cope with the problems of
adjusting to a social and cultural environment much different than their own.
In 16 States surveyed in 1969, approximately 85 percent of all Indian children
in foster care were living in non-Indian homes. In Minnesota today, according
to State figures more than 90 percent of nonrelated adoptions of Indian children
are made by non-Indian couples. Few States keep as careful or complete child
welfare statistics as Minnesota does, but informed estimates by welfare officials
elsewhere suggest that this rate is the norm. In most Federal and mission
boarding schools, a majority of the personnel is non-Indian.
H.R. Rep. at 9.
103. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
104. See id. at §§ 1902(4) and (5).
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in Indian communities and families.' °5 These practices deprived many
Indian children of their tribal and cultural heritage. 106 Against this background and based on its determination that no resource is more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,' 07
Congress enacted the ICWA to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. 0 8
The concept that Indian tribes possess natural rights of self-determination free from state interference permeates the ICWA. " In allocating
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, the ICWA reaffirms preICWA case law deferring to inherent tribal sovereignty over internal
welfare matters. 0 Pino adopts the policies of the ICWA. Pino's holding
that the child took the Pueblo domicile allowed the tribe to exert jurisdiction beyond the Pueblo boundary into a state adoption proceeding
involving tribal members."' Such exertion demonstrates the mechanism
provided by the ICWA to enable the tribe to protect its relationship with
its children." 2 Protecting the child-tribe relationship was a fundamental
reason for passing the ICWA because non-tribal officials ignored Indian
cultural norms that recognized the importance of child rearing to the
tribe. 3 Therefore, the ICWA and Pino unite in espousing the underlying
policy that tribal courts are better equipped to adjudicate Indian child
custody issues."'
Pino's holding that an illegitimate child takes the domicile of its mother
has been applied in numerous jurisdictions' and in ICWA cases"' and
is followed in another context by New Mexico courts." 7 The rule provides
a workable means for assigning domicile to an illegitimate child" 8 and
is consistent with the ICWA policy of strengthening Indian family and
105. Id. at § 1901(5).
106. Appeal in Pima CounnY, 130 Ariz. at 203, 635 P.2d at 188.
107. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
108. Id. at § 1902.
109. See Appeal in Pima County, 130 Ariz. at 203, 635 P.2d at 188.
110. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911(a)); see supra note 96.
Ill. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 735, 700 P.2d at 198; Appeal in Pima Count,, 130 Ariz. at 203,
635 P.2d at 188.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 204, 635 P.2d at 189.
114. See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Guardianship of Sharp, 41 Cal. App.2d 79, 82, 106 P.2d 244, 246 (1940); Danbury
v. New Haven, 5 Conn. 584, 586 (1825); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Kimbrough, 115 Ky. 512,
516, 74 S.W. 229 (1903); Krakow v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 326 Mass. 452,454, 95 N.E.2d 184,
185 (1950); In re Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 421, 18 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1945); Thayer v. Thayer, 187
N.C. 573, 574, 122 S.E. 307, 308 (1924); Sturgeon v. Korte, 34 Ohio St. 525, 535 (1878); In re
Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 314, 324 P.2d 773, 775 (1958); In re Moore, 68 Wash.2d 792, 796, 415
P.2d 653, 656 (1966).
116. See Goclanney v. Desrochers, 135 Ariz. 240, 242 n. 1, 660 P.2d 491, 493 n. I (Ct. App.
1982); Appeal in Pima County, 130 Ariz. at 206, 635 P.2d at 191.
117. Gomez, 101 N.M. at 45, 678 P.2d at 220.
118. Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
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tribal stability and security through tribal resolution of child custody
matters. 119
IV. IMPLICATIONS

120

The ICWA reflects a current congressional' 2' and judicial' 2 2 policy
favoring tribal self-determination. Pino's broad construction of the term
23
"domicile" reinforces the goal of promoting tribal self-government.'
In keeping with the expressed congressional policy of encouraging
tribal self-sufficiency,' 24 the Pino decision urges New Mexico court compliance with the ICWA's implied purpose of conferring tribal control over
Indian child welfare.' 25 Deferring to tribal authority could then entail
affording the earliest possible resolution of Indian child welfare matters. 126
It must be emphasized that this Note's author expresses no view as to
whether the best interests of the Indian child ultimately would be served
if adopted by the non-Indian couple or whether some other measure would
be more appropriate. The sole issue in Pino is who should decide what
is in the child's best interests.1 27 The Pino decision unequivocally establishes that the tribal court will make that decision. 128 This is consistent
29
with Congress' intent to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the tribes.
One thing is for certain: the jurisdictional confusion over the Pino case
in the children's court was not in the child's best interest. Therefore, the
state and tribes must adopt a cooperative stance to insure the welfare of
individual Indian children, a cooperative agreement reflecting promotion
of tribal self-government.
Recommendations for CooperativeAgreement 3 °
Pino affirms that an Indian tribe may extend its exclusive jurisdictional
119. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
120. Pino clarifies the law with respect to the jurisdiction of state courts over adoptions involving
Indian children domiciled on the reservation. Other questions remain to be answered:
1) Can tribal courts respect a mother's desire for anonymity in an adoption
proceeding when the ICWA placement preferences are with members of
the child's extended family or other members of the Indian child's tribe?
2) Will tribal courts respect a mother's placement preference for an adoption
if the preference is with non-Indian adoptive parents?
121. See ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(a).
122. See supra note 96.
123. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
124. See ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3), (4) and (5).
125. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 738, 700 P.2d at 201.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(3), (4) and (5).
130. For general discussions in support of the following recommendations, see Wamser, Child
Welfare Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A New Mexico Focus, 10 N.M.L. REV. 413
(1980); Lemprecht, The Indian Child Welfare Act-Tribal Self-Determination Through Participation
in Child Custody Proceedings, Wis. L. REV. 1202 (1979).
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power beyond reservation boundaries to child welfare actions involving
reservation-domiciled children. 3 ' Therefore, the states must undertake
conscious efforts to protect Indian children from unnecessary jurisdictional disputes. In the spirit of the ICWA's commitment to tribal exercise
of self-determination, the following specific actions are recommended in
post-Pino Indian child custody proceedings:
1) State intervention in Indian family affairs should be minimal.
2) State courts should seek to eliminate the effect of cultural bias
by requiring tribal participation in child custody proceedings involving Indian children.
3) Wherever possible, tribes should be given the opportunity to
deal with child welfare problems in a manner consistent with their
cultural norms.
4) In situtations where cultural and tribal interests, as well as the
child's interests, are at stake, the court should more readily accept
the contention that the child's best interests are identical to those of
the tribe.
5) Knowledge of a child's Indian heritage should automatically
put the state on notice of the tribe's responsibility for protecting the
child-tribe relationship.
6) If the parent is domiciled on the reservation, consents to adoptions should be taken before a tribal judge.
7) Doubt whether an Indian child is domiciled within the reservation of his or her tribe should be resolved in favor of tribal jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
By adopting a definition of domicile conducive to tribal resolution of
Indian child custody matters, the New Mexico Court of Appeals demonstrated a willingness to work with the tribes to address the problems
associated with illegitimate births among tribal members.' 32 Perhaps this
decision' 33 will function as a catalyst to stimulate state and tribal cooperation in preserving the cultural heritage of New Mexico's Indian children.
CINDY L. TURCOTTE

131. See Pino, 102 N.M. at 737-38, 700 P.2d at 200-01.
132. Id.
133. Id.

